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Mixed Court and Jury Court:
Could the Continental Alternative
Fill the American Need?
John H. Langbein
For cases of serious crime a number ofEuropean countries employ a variant
of the jury called the mixed court, in which laymen andprofessional judges sit
together in a single panel that deliberates and decides on all issues of verdict
and sentence. Trials in the mixed court proceed quite rapidly, in large mea-
sure because the mixed court dispenses with most of the time-consuming prac-
tices ofjury control that characterize Anglo-American trial procedure. Conse-
quently, the legal system can process all cases of serious crime to full trial.
The present article describes the German mixed-court system and contrasts it
with the American jury, asking to what extent the mixed court serves the pur-
poses of the jury. The conclusion is that the mixed court serves the jury poli-
cies well, though not fully; and that it is a superior alternative to the indige-
nous nontrial devices-plea bargaining and bench trial-that have displaced
the jury from routine American practice.
In the nineteenth century a number of European countries set out to
emulate the Anglo-American criminal jury system. After much experi-
mentation, especially in the German states, there emerged from this proc-
ess of reception and adaptation the "mixed court" of lay and profes-
sional judges, which has become the prevalent form of court structure for
cases of serious crime in modern Europe. I Professional judges join with
juror-like lay judges to form a trial panel that deliberates and decides col-
lectively on all issues of guilt determination (which we shall hereafter call
verdict) and sentence.
The mixed court shares with the jury court the idea that the participa-
John H. Langbein is Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law, University of Chicago
Law School, and Affiliated Scholar, American Bar Foundation.
The author wishes to thank Joachim Herrmann for arranging interviews with lay judge selection
officers in Germany. References and suggestions from Albert Alschuler, Gerhard Casper, Joachim
Herrmann, Spencer Kimball, Thomas Weigend, and Peter Westen, and the research assistance of
Joseph Rugg are gratefully acknowledged, as is the financial support of the American Bar Founda-
tion and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.
I. For a concise English-language account of the history of the invention of the mixed court in
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Stud. 135, 136-41 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Casper & Zeisel). Figures on the modern extent of the
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tion of nonprofessionals in criminal adjudication is a value of fundamen-
tal importance. However, the mixed court injects lay participation in a
fashion that greatly accelerates trial procedure by comparison with the
jury court, because the mixed court dispenses with our familiar trappings
of jury control.
As the Anglo-American jury system has grown ever more cumbersome,
it has fallen ever more into disuse (a phenomenon discussed further in
part II of this article). Thoughtful observers have begun to wonder
whether the mixed court-the Continental offshoot of our jury system-
might become an object of emulation for us. In 1977 the then president
of the American Bar Association noticed that the recent Supreme Court
cases on jury size might "permit experimentation with combinations of
laymen and professional judges, such as the mixed courts that accelerate
the procedure in criminal matters in a number of Continental
countries. "2
This article takes the German version of the mixed-court system as the
subject of comparative study. German experience with mixed courts has
been the longest and most varied, and the German system has attracted a
significant scholarly literature. 3 My immediate object is to explore a fun-
damental question that arises when Americans attempt to evaluate the
mixed court from the perspective of the common law tradition: To what
2. Justin A. Stanley, The Resolution of Minor Disputes and the Seventh Amendment, 60 Mar-
quette L. Rev. 963, 971 (1977). (Stanley's context was the reform of American small claims courts,
an exceptionally adventurous borrowing from the criminal procedural context of the mixed court.)
There are faint stirrings in the direction of a mixed court in England. See Antony Allott, A Special
Crown Court: Overcoming the Law's Delays, 143 Justice of the Peace 707 (1979), proposing a court
composed of "a professional judge or magistrate sitting with two lay magistrates." ("Magistrates"
in this usage are the citizens, predominantly nonlawyers, who serve as justices of the peace.) A simi-
lar thought has been attributed to the Lord Chancellor, whom the Economist describes as "consider-
ing offering defendants a 'lay magistrate plus judge' option instead [of jury trial]." Juries: Held in
Contempt, Economist, Mar. 8, 1980, at 69. Some years ago Glanville Williams pointed to the exam-
ple of the mixed court in arguing for the extension of jury authority to matters of sentence. Glanville
Williams, The Proof of Guilt 299-304 (2d ed. London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1958). See also J. A.
Andrews, Uses and Misuses of the Jury, in Reshaping the Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of Glan-
ville Williams 37, 56 (P. R. Glazebrook, ed.) (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1978).
The state of Vermont employs a pair of laymen as "assistant judges" in a variety of matters, civil
and criminal. However, in cases of serious crime the assistant and professional judges are conceived
of as the "bench" that presides and sentences, while a separate and conventional jury performs the
customary trial function. Recently, the state supreme court ruled in a first-degree murder case that
to continue to allow these lay judges to participate in determining questions of law violated due
process. State v. Dunkerley, 365 A.2d 131 (1976). See generally on the use of laymen in lower
judicial office, Linda Silberman, Non-Attorney Justice in the United States: An Empirical Study
(New York: Institute of Judicial Administration, 1979).
3. In addition to the works by Casper & Zeisel, supra note 1, see Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Das
Laienrichtertum in der Strafrechtspflege der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Schweiz, 94
Schweizerische Zeitschrift fUr Strafrecht 229 (1977), and modern literature there cited. For older
work see the two-volume set of studies, Schwurgerichte and SchOffengerichte (Wolfgang Mitter-
maier & M. Liepmann, eds.) (Leipzig, 1908). A forthcoming book is John P. Richert, The Role of
Lay Judges in the West German Criminal Courts (1981?). I have discussed the work of the mixed
courts in John H. Langbein, Comparative Criminal Procedure: Germany (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Co., 1977).
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extent may the mixed court be said to serve the purposes of the Anglo-
American criminal jury? Part I of the article outlines the principal fea-
tures of mixed court structure and operation; it surveys what is known
about the influence of the laymen vis-a.-vis the professional judges and
discusses some peculiarities of the process that the Germans use to select
the laymen. Part II is devoted to the theory of the American jury; I have
tried to identify the main purposes that criminal jury trial has been
thought to serve in the common law tradition, in order to test the Con-
tinental mixed court for its fidelity to these principles. The conclusion is
drawn that the mixed court cannot fully serve the panoply of jury policies
but that it comes much closer than the indigenous devices-bench trial
and plea bargaining-that have displaced jury trial from routine Ameri-
can practice. Accordingly, the suggestion is made that the mixed court
could find a place in the United States within a hierarchy of trial modes.
I. THE GERMAN MIXED COURTS
Although the notion of lay participation in criminal adjudication traces
back to Germanic antiquity, its only important survival in the late medie-
val world was the English jury.4 For cases of serious crime the courts of
the early modern absolutist states of Europe were staffed exclusively with
professional judges. At a time well before the independence of the judi-
ciary had been established, these courts were subjected to political inter-
ference in cases that interested the rulers. 5
Court structure was one of the major interests of legal reform efforts
in the eighteenth century. Reform writers were certain that they wanted
judicial independence, in order to eliminate executive interference in ad-
judication, but they were nonetheless distrustful of a judiciary that had
for so long been under the heel of political authority. Accordingly, Bec-
caria and others popularized the English jury as a safeguard against judi-
cial subservience.6
French experimentation with jury-like bodies commenced immediately
after the Revolution. 7 The form that ultimately emerged was a jury meant
to decide all matters of "fact" but with questions of "law" reserved to
the bench. This impossibly conceptual distinction was supposed to be im-
plemented by having the jury render what amounted to a detailed special
4. The theme of John P. Dawson, A History of Lay Judges (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1960).
5. See John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law 242-58 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law
School, 1968); JUrgen Regge, Kabinettsjustiz in Brandenburg-Preussen (Berlin: Duncker & Hum-
blot, 1977).
6. Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments, in Alessandro Manzoni, The Column of In-
famy, prefaced by Cesare Beccaria's Of Crimes and Punishments, trans. Kenelm Foster & Jane
Grigson, 23 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).
7. Adhemar Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure 408-18, 433-35, 460-61,
462-99 (trans. J. Simpson) (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1913).
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verdict in response to interrogatories framed by the bench. Napoleon
planted this institution in parts of Germany, especially on the Rhine
where the French ruled until 1814. When the Revolution of 1848 forced
rulers in the German states to acquiesce in demands for the criminal
jury,8 the French model was widely instituted in a somewhat modified
form; a special verdict system was retained, but jurors were also asked to
express their view on guilt or innocence.
During the 1850s and 1860s the practical difficulties in operating this
style of jury gave rise to considerable complaint in Germany,9 which ulti-
mately led to experimentation with another mode of lay participation, the
mixed court. Several of the German states developed versions of this so-
called Schoffengericht, especially Hanover and Saxony; the Prussians
embraced the mixed court after conquering Hanover. By the 1870s when
unified national codes of procedure and court structure were being
drafted, the Prussians sought to eliminate the jury court entirely in favor
of the mixed court. The politics of the moment resulted in a compromise
for the 1877 code that lasted until 1924: The jury court was retained for
the most serious crimes, the mixed court tried the least offenses, and a
wholly professional court exercised jurisdiction over a middle band of of-
fenses. Dissatisfaction with the jury court never abated; it was abolished
in favor of the mixed court in 1924. 10
The mixed court has, therefore, undergone fairly continuous alteration
in structure and jurisdiction during the century since it was extended to
the whole of Germany, II and there is no reason to think that that process
is at an end. 12 As recently as 1975 some changes were made in the rules
for selecting lay judges, and one infrequently used form of mixed court
was eliminated. 13
A. The System in Outline
In current practicel4 mixed courts come in two basic varieties. A court
of five judges-two lay and three professional-tries cases of more seri-
ous crime; this court is ordinarily known as the Grosse Strafkammer but
8. Erich Schwinge, Der Kampf urn die Schwurgerichte (Breslau 1926).
9. GUnther Hadding, Schwurgerichte in Deutschland: Der Schwurgerichtsgedanke seit 1848
(Kassel: Schneider & Weber, 1974).
10. For an English-language summary ofthese developments see Casper & Zeisel, supra note I, at
136-41.
11. By the Statute on Court Organization (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) of 1877, on whose history
see Peter Landau, Die Reichsjustizgesetze von 1879 und die deutsche Rechtseinheit, in Yom Reichs-
justizamt zum Bundesministerium der Justiz 161 (Cologne: Bundesanzeiger-Verlagsgesellschaft,
1977).
12. See Jescheck, supra note 3, at 232.
13. Discussed infra, text at note 69.
14. See generally Claus Roxin, ed., Strafverfahrensrecht 30-35 (16th ed. Munich: C. H. Beck,
1980); Eduard Kern & Manfred Wolf, Gerichtsverfassungsrecht 150-58 (5th ed. Munich: C. H.
Beck, 1975).
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is called the Schwurgericht when sitting for certain very serious offenses
including homicides. Less serious crimes are tried to a court of three
judges-two lay and one professional-still called the Schojjengericht.
(Petty offenses are tried to a single professional judge, but from him
there is a right of appeal de novo to a three-judge court, the Kleine Straj-
kammer, staffed with two lay judges and one professional.) For simplic-
ity's sake and despite the inelegance, we shall speak of the two types of
mixed courts by their composition figures, lay-judge figures first, as the
Two-Three and Two-One courts.
In American procedure lay participation is highly waivable; the ac-
cused who is entitled to jury trial may elect to be tried by judge alone, or
he may waive trial altogether by conceding guilt. IS In the vast proportion
of cases he does one or the other. 16 In modern German procedure the
first option (waiver of lay participation) is unknown and the second
(waiver of trial) is permitted only in cases so mild that the sanction of im-
prisonment cannot result. Furthermore, the German prosecutor cannot
affect the right to lay participation in adjudication by manipulating his
charging power; in cases of serious crime the celebrated rule of compul-
sory prosecution17 requires him to charge in the strongest and most inclu-
sive form that the evidence will support. I have elsewhere explained the
efficiencies that permit German criminal procedure to function without
prosecutorial discretion and without plea bargaining;18 the present point
is that lay participation under the mixed court system is not a merely
nominal right, it is a reality for every case in which the sanction of im-
prisonment might apply.
A single statutory formula governs the voting arrangements in both the
Two-Three and Two-One courts. Section 263(1) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that any decision that disadvantages the accused
(meaning both verdict and sentence) must be taken with a two-thirds ma-
jority. In the Two-Three court this voting rule requires that a minimum
four of the five judges agree upon a verdict of conviction. The two lay-
men have, therefore, a veto power if they act together; they can acquit
over the opposition of the three professionals, but they cannot convict
without the votes of two professionals. In the Two-One court that tries
the lesser cases, the two-thirds voting rule allows the two laymen either to
15. The prosecution may insist on jury trial even if the accused wishes to waive it, but this seldom
occurs. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). In practice the only important election is the
accused's.
16. I have collected some figures in John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 3, 9 & n.ll (1978).
17. See generally John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 439 (1974).
18. On discretion, id.; on plea bargaining, John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining:
How the Germans Do It, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 204 (1979).
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convict and sentence or to acquit over the opposition of the professional.
In either court the outcome of a trial is conviction or acquittal; there is
no provision for stalemate comparable to the Anglo-American hung jury.
(We shall deal below with empirical data on the actual operation of the
voting rules.)
The professional judge or judges are responsible for preparing a writ-
ten opinion to explain the court's findings of fact and law. In the event of
conviction this opinion must also supply the reasoning for the court's
sentence. 19 This expansive document has, of course, no counterpart in
the one- or two-word general verdict of the Anglo-American jury.
The requirement of a reasoned opinion supports a system of appellate
review that departs markedly from Anglo-American expectations. The
appellate system has a major effect on the operation of the mixed-court
system. From any decision of the Two-One court there is a full appeal de
novo (Berufung) to the Two-Three court. That is, no presumption of cor-
rectness attaches to the first-instance proceeding, and the case is fully re-
tried. From the Two-Three court, whether sitting as a first-instance court
in cases of serious crime or as a de novo trial court in cases once tried in
the Two-One court, appeal lies only for error (Revision) and is heard by a
court of five professional judges.20
Prosecution and defense have equal rights of appeal, on issues both of
culpability and of sentence. German law adheres to the Continental tradi-
tion that appeal lies against acquittal as well as conviction (a question
that once split the U.S. Supreme Court,21 with Justice Holmes arguing
that our constitutional double jeopardy prohibition should not be con-
strued to prevent the state's appeal of an acquittal).
On account of these differences, the prospect of appellate review
presses more heavily on a German mixed court than on an Anglo-Ameri-
can jury court. This is a point to which we shall recur in discussing the in-
fluence of lay participation in the mixed-court system.
The mixed court retires at the conclusion of the oral public trial for de-
liberations in order to formulate its judgment. The presiding judge (the
only professional in the Two-One court, the senior professional in the
Two-Three court) "leads" these in camera proceedings and also, in the
words of the statute, "puts the questions and takes the votes. "22 By con-
vention the presiding judge (or, in the Two-Three court, another of the
professionals) opens the deliberations by summarizing the evidence that
has just been adduced at the trial. 23
19. Strafprozessordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure) § 267(1).
20. See generally Roxin, supra note 14, at 281-312; for an English-language account, Langbein,
supra note 3, at 82-86.
21. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
22. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz § 194(1).
23. Casper & Zeisel, supra note I, at 151.
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Modern German mixed courts discharge their caseloads with enviable
dispatch. The study by Gerhard Casper and Hans Zeisel established that
an average trial for a serious offense in a Two-Three court lasts one day;
trial in the Two-One court requires about two hours. 24 The mixed-court
structure accelerates German procedure by comparison with our own
because it dispenses with the time-consuming features of the jury system
that are so prominent in common law jury trials, especially the rules of
evidence, jury instructions, and the other elements of jury control. (The
extended voir dire of prospective jurors common in American jury prac-
tice is another source of delay that, we shall see, lacks any counterpart in
the German mixed-court procedure.)
To be sure, factors other than mixed-court structure contribute to the
efficiency of German criminal trials, including the economies associated
with nonadversarial trial procedure. The presiding judge both "exam-
ines" and "cross-examines," after which he invites his fellow judges
(professional and lay), the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and the ac-
cused to supplement his questioning. In conducting examinations, the
presiding judge works from the official file of the case, the dossier, which
contains the pretrial statements and public records gathered by police and
prosecutors. These officials work under a statutory duty to investigate ex-
culpatory as well as inculpatory evidence. This duty is reinforced in the
pretrial phase by giving to the defense liberal rights to inspect the dossier,
together with the right to motion the prosecution to investigate (at public
expense) any defensive claims and evidence that might have been over-
looked.
This thorough, open, and impartial pretrial preparation effectively
eliminates surprise and forensic strategy from the trial. It also enables the
presiding judge who determines the sequence of witnesses to control for
relevance and to minimize needless duplication of trial testimony. Nonad-
versarial procedure assigns no burdens of proof to the parties. German
law adheres to a standard of proof not materially different from our
"beyond reasonable doubt"; but without the system of adversary presen-
tation of evidence, there is no occasion to think of the "prosecution
case" (or, indeed, of the defendant's burden of proving an "affirmative
defense"). The only burden is the court's. In order to convict, the court
must satisfy itself of the truth of the charges after taking the relevant evi-
dence, including that requested by prosecution and defense. Thus, the
court that must decide the case conducts its own trial inquiry in a busi-
nesslike and undramatic fashion, overseen by prosecution and defense. 25
No modern system can delegate unrestrained powers of criminal ad-
24. [d. at 149-51. American trial duration data is collected in Langbein, supra note 16, at 10 &
n.18.
25. This and the previous paragraph are derived from Langbein, supra note 18, at 207-8.
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judication to laymen-that is, to people who lack legal training and ex-
perience and who do not bear professional responsibility for their work.
The Anglo-American jury system, by isolating the laymen, complicates
the task of safeguarding against the dangers of ignorance and bias that
inhere in any attempt to use laymen in adjudication. Because the jury de-
liberates without professional participation and decides without giving
reasons, there is virtually no opportunity to provide learned guidance to
the jurors during deliberations, and the means of detecting and relieving
against errors after verdict are quite limited. Accordingly, our system of
jury control has been designed to work anticipatorily. Voir dire is sup-
posed to discover and reject for service potential jurors who would not be
fair-minded, notwithstanding the difficulty of making such predictions
and the amount of time that the process can require. We conceive of po-
tential error, and we try to prevent it. The law of evidence is meant to ex-
clude from jurors information whose relevance they might misapprehend,
but the cost of this exclusionary system in time and complexity is im-
mense. The trial judge's instructions ostensibly identify and resolve for
the jurors in advance of their deliberations the legal problems that may
arise, although the format of multiple contingent instructions protracts
the trial and probably bewilders the jurors.26
The mixed court relies upon three quite different safeguards against lay
inexperience: the presence of professional judges in deliberations, the re-
quirement of reasoned opinion, and liberal appellate review. Professional
judges discuss the rules of law and caution against unfounded uses of evi-
dence in camera when and if the need arises. "Since these deliberations oc-
cur out of the presence of counsel, the requirement of written opinion is
a central protection. Important findings of fact and rulings of law are
meant to show up in the judgment and be subject to appeal. Collegiality
serves as another protection against judicial arbitrariness or error in the
deliberations, because three professionals sit in the Two-Three trial court
(and in the Two-Three court that proceeds by trial de novo in appeals
from the Two-One court).
B. Influence of the Laymen
By comparison with the Anglo-American jury system, the German
mixed court enhances lay authority in certain significant respects. In the
mixed court the lay judges participate in determining sentence as well as
verdict, whereas at common law the work of the criminal jury ceases with
the verdict, and only relatively minor statutory intrusions into sentencing
26. "Juries have the disadvantage . . . of being treated like children while the testimony is going
on, but then being doused with a kettleful of law during the charge that would make a third-year law
student blanch." Curtis Bok, I Too, Nicodemus 261-62 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946).
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have been made. 27 German lay judges also participate in all rulings of
law; and, accordingly, no exclusionary rules can be employed to limit
their view of the evidence.
In other respects, however, the mixed court diminishes lay authority.
Laymen are much fewer in number, and they do not act independently of
the professionals. They have the power to force acquittal, but only in the
Two-One court for lesser offenses can they convict without professional
assent. The requirement of reasoned opinion exposes the judgments of
the mixed courts to deep-reaching appellate review at the behest of either
the defendant or the prosecution.
One serious attempt has been made to measure the influence of the lay-
men in the German mixed courts. In their landmark empirical study un-
dertaken a decade ago, Casper and Zeisel compiled a careful sample of
about six hundred cases from both types of mixed courtS.28 Following to
some extent the methodology of the earlier American Jury29 project, the
investigators had professional judges reply anonymously to a standard-
ized questionnaire about the mixed-court trials in which they presided.
One object of the study was to identify the proportion of cases in which
lay and professional judges found themselves in initial disagreement and
then to see how frequently the laymen persisted in their views.
The main findings of this aspect of the Casper and Zeisel study may be
summarized as follows: 30
1. On the question of guilt (verdict), some lay and professional judges
in the mixed courts found themselves in some disagreement at the outset
of their deliberations in 6.5 percent of all cases.
2. On the question of sentence, where the range of permissible out-
comes is much broader than on verdict, some initial disagreement be-
tween lay and professional judges occurred in 20.1 percent of all cases.
3. In the 6.5 percent of the cases in which there was initial disagree-
27. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), where the bifurcated California procedure
and the unitary Ohio procedure for jury determination of death sentences were upheld.
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals said in its Report on
Courts, Standard 5.1, at 110 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), "Jury sen-
tencing should be abolished in all situations." It explained:
Although 13 States still allow jury sentencing in noncapital cases, the practice has been condemned by every
serious study and analysis in the last half.century. Jury sentencing is nonprofessional and is more likely than
judge sentencing to be arbitrary and based on emotions rather than the needs of the offender or society.
Sentencing by juries leads to disparate sentences and leaves little opportunity for development of sentencing
policies.
[d., Commentary. This hostility to jury participation in sentencing is widespread; it is quite difficult
to reconcile with the supposed virtues of the jury in matters of verdict, discussed below in part II of
this article.
28. For detail on the study design, including the weighting of certain data, see Casper & Zeisel,
supra note I, at 143-46.
29. Harry Kalven, Jr., & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966).
30. Casper & Zeisel, supra note I, at 185-91.
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ment on guilt, one or more of the lay judges persisted in voting against
the professionals in 30 percent of the cases; in 21 percent (mostly in the
Two-One court) the lay votes affected the verdict. These cases in which
lay voting altered the outcome constituted 1.4 percent of the entire sam-
ple of cases.
4. Lay influence on sentencing was greater, in part because sentencing
disagreements were often resolved by compromise. The lay votes affected
32 percent of the cases in which there was initial disagreement, or 6.2 per-
cent of the entire sample of cases.
Commenting on their findings, Casper and Zeisel remarked that the
"traceable overall effect of the lay judges on the verdicts of the German
criminal courts is indeed small.... Compared to the American jury, the
difference is marked. American juries arrive at a verdict that is different
from that of the presiding judge in 22 percent of all cases [according to
the American Jury data]."31
The contrast between a 1.4 percent figure for lay influence on verdict
in the German mixed court and a 22 percent figure in the American jury
court needs to be probed with care. If the contrast were a fair one, it
would indicate that the laymen in the German procedure are far less in-
fluential than American jurors, and it might incline us to suspect that the
purposes attributed to the jury system are not being served at adequate
levels in the German mixed courts. In my view, however, the contrast is
seriously misleading for several reasons:
1. It does not correct for the marked disparity between the two groups
of cases. In Germany every case of serious crime goes to trial before one
of the mixed courts. In the United States only the tiny fraction of cases
that have resisted negotiated diversion (primarily plea bargaining) go to
trial. Most of the easy cases, where disagreement between judge and jury
would be least likely, have been filtered out of the American trial statis-
tics. Indeed, in calculating their 1.4 percent figure for Germany, Casper
and Zeisel did not exclude the 41 percent of their case sample in which
the accused confessed at trial, making disagreement about guilt a prac-
tical impossibility.32
2. The 1.4 to 22 contrast overlooks the import of the relatively sub-
stantial 6.2 percent figure for lay influence on sentencing in the German
mixed court. In the American system where the jury is excluded from di-
rect participation in sentencing, it is by the manipulation of degrees and
counts that the jury brings what are in truth sentencing considerations to
bear on the outcome. The 22 percent American figure for judge/jury dis-
agreement on guilt includes disagreements over offense characterization
and the number of counts that are mostly sentencing disputes in function.
31. Id. at 189-91.
32. This and the next paragraph are derived from Langbein, supra note 3, at 137-38.
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3. The assumption that the measure of lay influence is persistence in
disagreement with the professionals is misleading if it implies that laymen
yield because they are intimidated rather than persuaded. The Casper and
Zeisel study describes the circumstances in a number of the deliberations
in which the laymen yielded after initial disagreement. These were in gen-
eral cases in which the professional judges were unmistakably correct on
rational, legal, and humanitarian grounds. 33 Judicial persuasion pre-
vented lay intolerance or misunderstanding from resulting in injustice.
4. Lay participation has a predominantly preventive purpose. As I
shall emphasize below in part II when discussing the jury policies, the
presence of laymen is meant to deter professional judges from political
subservience and from arbitrariness. A system of lay participation that
serves these goals quite fully need leave no trace in lay/professional dis-
agreement. The methodology of the Casper and Zeisel study simply does
not address this realm of lay influence.
To conclude: There are some respects in which it is fair to say that two
laymen who are merged with one or three professional judges lack the au-
thority of a dozen laymen who possess the exclusive verdict power. But
the laymen on the mixed court are fully informed; no law of evidence has
concealed probative matter from them, no system of jury control has
been employed to cordon them off from the totality of criminal adjudica-
tion. Rather, their votes extend to matters of law and of sentence. The
implication in the Casper and Zeisel study that lay influence in the Ger-
man mixed courts is inadequate, and that it is materially below the levels
achieved in Anglo-American jury courts, is neither supported by the em-
pirical data, nor properly appreciative of factors that an empirical study
cannot measure. Indeed, there is good reason for treating this one objec-
tionable passage in an otherwise masterful piece of scholarship as nothing
more than an offband remark; it was a digression in a work whose main
inquiry into the German practice was not comparative. A decade later an
occasion did arise for comparative consideration of the findings of the
Casper and Zeisel article-in the course of judicial proceedings. In an af-
fidavit to an American court convened in 1979 for a remarkable criminal
trial in Berlin, Dean Casper said of the comparative significance of the
Casper and Zeisel study: "Our study clearly indicates that German lay
judges exercise independent judgment in criminal cases, and do serve a
societal purpose comparable to that of American juries-namely, inject-
ing the values, experiences, and judgments of the lay community into the
adjudication process. "34
33. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 3, at 155-75.
34. Quoted in C. M. A. McCauliff, The Reach of the Constitution: American Peace-time Court
in West Berlin, 55 Notre Dame Law. 682, 696 (1980).
HeinOnline -- 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 206 1981
206 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH JOURNAL 1981:195
c. Selection of Lay Judges
Lay judges serve four-year terms. Each layman sits for several days per
year-once a month is the pattern suggested by statute. 35 He acquires as
his term advances some general familiarity with trial procedure and the
work of adjudication, although hardly enough to feel socialized into pro-
fessional legal culture. The process for choosing lay judges every fourth
year is divided into a nomination and a selection phase. The governing
statute36 prescribes some fairly obvious disqualifications (incapacity, age,
officeholding, and so forth) but otherwise provides the authorities with
little guidance on how they should construct their lists.
A valuable empirical study by Ekkehard Klausa has shown that there is
great diversity in the nomination practices of the local authorities.37
Klausa found some authorities compiling an essentially random list of
residents. Other authorities effectively delegated the task to the political
parties represented on the city council. In Berlin the authorities allowed
the police to exercise a veto power over the provisional list.
In Augsburg, where I interviewed the administrator in charge of com-
piling the 1980 nomination list,38 the local authority was pursuing a vigor-
ous policy of encouraging citizens to volunteer for lay judging service.
The cooperation of the local press had been enlisted to publicize the work
of the lay judges and to advise citizens how to apply for service by phone
or in person. This campaign for volunteers was undertaken at the behest
of the professional judiciary, which had communicated the view that
citizens who displayed such interest in serving made "better" lay judges
than did forced recruits. The Augsburg authority needed to compile a list
of 739 nominees. It obtained 384 volunteers. It then asked the political
parties in the city council to supply the remainder, in proportion to their
representation on the council. The parties were not able to supply that
many; they named 221 people. The remaining 134 names needed to com-
plete the list were computer generated in a random manner from the local
population list. Augsburg's relative success at getting volunteers contrasts
with the experience in the North German cities studied by Klausa, where
volunteers were not a significant component of the nominees. He found,
for example, that the authority in Cologne had abandoned the practice of
35. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz § 43(2). The statute says "twelve regular session days per year,"
and the practice is to spread them.
36. [d. §§ 32-36.
37. Ekkehard Klausa, Ehrenamtliche Richter: Ihre Auswahl und Funktion, empirisch untersucht
23-46 Frankfurt (Main): Athenlium-Verlag GmbH (1972). For an English-language summary see
Langbein, supra note 3, at 142-44. For similar findings from a different data base see Casper &
Zeisel, supra note I, at 183.
38. Interview, Einwohnermeldeamt der Stadt Augsburg, June 27, 1980.
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campaigning for volunteers for want of adequate response, and that
volunteers there constituted only 5 percent of the total. 39
In the second phase of the selection process a selection commission
chooses which nominees will become lay judges. The number to be cho-
sen is set by an officer of the criminal court, who estimates the number of
lay judges that will be needed for the likely caseload.40 The selection com-
mittee is chaired by a judge and contains, in addition to an administrator
from the state government, ten citizens chosen by the elected local gov-
ernments within the judicial district.41 In practice these ten members of
the selection commission are chosen by the political parties in proportion
to the parties' representation on the local councils. The commission de-
cides by two-thirds majority vote. Klausa found considerable diversity in
the working methods of the commissions.42 In Berlin the parties received
the list of nominees in advance of the commission meeting; each party
designated a number of lay judges proportionate to its representation on
the commission, whose actual meeting was therefore perfunctory. Else-
where, party influence on selection was more indirect. Selection commis-
sion members did not seem to prefer fellow party members as such, but
they did express a preference for people they knew personally, and often
those people had shared party affiliations.
Apart from personal acquaintance, the datum regarded as most rele-
vant by selection commission members was occupation (information that
appears with the names on the local population records from which the
names are obtained). Members thought that it was important to achieve a
wide distribution of occupations, but they went about it casually. There
was a favorite group of occupations: teachers, civil servants, social work-
ers, administrative personnel. As a result civil servants and other white-
collar personnel were relatively overrepresented, housewives and blue-
collar employees relatively underrepresented.43
In Augsburg, the local authority advised the selection commission
which of the nominees were volunteers, which party designated, and
which computer generated, on the theory that the commission would
probably prefer to avoid the computer-generated nominees.44
Once the selection commission has chosen the cohort of lay judges, the
administrative office of the court assigns them quite randomly to particu-
lar chambers and dates of attendance. (Similar procedures are used to as-
39. Klausa, supra note 37, at 28.
40. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz §43(1).
41. [d. § 40.
42. Klausa, supra note 37, at 30-47.
43. [d. at 33-47.
44. Interview, Einwohnermeldeamt der Stadt Augsburg, June 27, 1980.
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sign alternates for service in the event of illness or other incapacity.)4S
Lay judges may thereafter be challenged by prosecution or defense only
on those grounds of relationship or prejudice for which professional
judges may be recused;46 this happens with the greatest rarity. Conse-
quently, there is no analogue to the voir dire of an American jury.
Although the statute states that the list of nominees should be repre-
sentative of "all groups in the population, "47 neither the statutory proce-
dures nor the practices of the local authorities and commissions seem
directed to that end. The emphasis on getting people who are interested
in lay judging, or who are known to the local elected officials and party
leaders, as well as the commissions' preference for white-collar occupa-
tions, produces a group of laymen whose educational and social back-
ground is rather closer to that of the professional judges. Of course,
other groups of the population are merely underrepresented, not ex-
cluded.
In sum, this selection system has a haphazard quality that contrasts
curiously with the meticulous design of the court system it serves. The
well-intentioned efforts to identify citizens who are interested in lay judg-
ing and who feel comfortable with the job may-by reducing the diversi-
ty of the lay cohort-diminish the effectiveness of the lay role.
II. THE MIXED COURT AND THE GOALS OF THE JURY SYSTEM
In 1968 the Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Louisiana "that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal
cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come under
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee. "48 Duncan led in the 1970s to a series
of cases questioning the constitutionality of various state schemes for
nonunanimous jury verdicts and juries of fewer than 12 members. In
companion cases decided in 1972, Johnson v. Louisiana49 and Apodaca
v. Oregon, so the court sustained nonunanimous verdicts of 12-member
juries. In 1970 in Williams v. FloridaSi the court approved a jury of 6 per-
sons; in 1978 in Ballew v. GeorgiaS2 it disapproved a jury of 5; and in
1979 in Burch v. LouisianaH it held that the verdict of a jury of 6 must be
unanimous.
In these recent jury cases appear succinct statements of the Court's un-
derstanding of the purposes of the constitutional jury guarantee. They
45. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz § 45.
46. Strafprozessordnung §§ 22, 24-31.
47. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz § 36(2).
48. 391 u.s. 145 (1968).
49. 406 u.s. 356 (1972).
50. 406 u.s. 404 (1972).
51. 399 u.s. 78 (1970).
52. 435 u.s. 223 (1978).
53. 441 u.s. 130 (1979).
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form a convenient repository of sources for our inquiry, which is to iden-
tify in functional terms the main purposes that the criminal jury is
thought to serve. (The object, it has been said, is to test the mixed court
against these standards. Our interest is in the comparative merits of two
forms of lay participation in criminal adjudication. Accordingly, we shall
not have occasion to lengthen our view of the purposes of the jury
beyond its adjudicative role to the higher realms of social and political
theory, where discussion can be found of the significance of lay participa-
tion for promoting social solidarity and legitimating public authority.)
A. The Purposes of the Criminal Jury
1. The Jury Is Nonbureaucratic
Of the many purposes attributed to the jury, one stands out as para-
mount. The power to condemn citizens to criminal sanctions is potential-
ly so dangerous that it ought not to be left entirely to hirelings of the
state. "Those who wrote our constitutions," said Justice White in Dun-
can, "knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect
against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and
against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The
framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but
insisted upon .further protection against arbitrary action."54 Jury trial
gives the accused "an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or over-
zealous prosecutor and against the complaint, biased, or eccentric judge.
. . . Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Gov-
ernments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law in this
insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or
innocence." 55
A similar theme runs through the nineteenth-century European history
of adaptation of the jurY,56 although it has begun to be questioned in
modern German thinking. 57
The essence of the safeguard is the relative independence of the laymen.
Laymen do not depend for their livelihood on the favor of the authorities
who staff the criminal justice system. Unlike professional judges, they do
not have an interest in professional advancement that might tempt them to
abide political interference. Hence, they lack incentive to defer to corrupt
or otherwise willful misuse of the criminal process.
Every modern criminal procedural system contains many safeguards
against abusive prosecution and judicial connivance, quite apart from lay
participation in adjudication. Yet because the standard of proof must be
54. 391 U.S. at 156.
55. Id.
56. Schwinge, supra note 8, passim.
57. Jescheck, supra note 3, at 237-38; Kern & Wolf, supra note 14, at 152.
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subjective, criminal adjudication .still depends upon the good faith of the
trier. The presence of laymen is not a foolproof safeguard; the profes-
sionals have opportunities to deceive the laymen in either system, jury or
mixed court. Against that danger both systems have appellate checks-re-
view of trial rulings and jury instructions in our system and substantive
review of the verdict and sentence of the German mixed courts. Lay par-
ticipation is above all a deterrent safeguard, and in neither system is there
evidence that it has failed to deter the professional judiciary from politi-
cal subservience in criminal adjudication.
2. The Jury Is Collegial
In Anglo-American law, where the notion of a collegial trial bench has
largely disappeared, the jury is our only device for bringing group deci-
sion making to criminal adjudication. This aspect of the jury's function is
alluded to in the Duncan opinion when the Supreme Court speaks of the
jury as a check against "arbitrary action" by the judiciary or the misbe-
havior of an "eccentric judge."58
The mixed court is at least as effective as the jury at checking judicial
eccentricity. The Anglo-American trial judge acts without lay participa-
tion on evidentiary and other trial motions; most importantly, his discre-
tion in sentencing is untempered by the lay hand. 59 In the German mixed
court system each professional must reckon with the participation of two
other professionals in the Two-Three courts for major offenses; and in
whichever mixed court a professional sits, he is joined by two laymen at
every step of trial, deliberation, verdict, and sentence. Thereafter he is
obliged to join in a reviewable opinion explaining his view of the evidence
and the law.
Collegiality is, of course, not unrelated to concerns about numerosity
of lay viewpoints that were at issue in the jury size cases and which we
discuss below under the rubric of jury representativeness.
3. Jurors Bring Lay Skills
A certain amount of ignorance has been thought to be a virtue in crimi-
nal adjudication. It has been argued that involving citizens who are neither
legally trained nor routinely engaged in the administration of criminal
justice brings positive benefits. (There are, of course, counterarguments,
but that is beside the point.)
a) Laymen bring freshness. Professional judges with long experience in
criminal adjudication may become calloused. Because laymen have not
58. 391 u.s. at 156.
59. But see note 27 supra.
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heard the same alibi a hundred times before, they may be more alert to its
merits in the occasional case in which it is not false.
b) Laymen are sometimes said to be better fact finders and law ap-
pliers than professional judges, because they are closer to the affairs and
experience of ordinary folk. The claim is sometimes heard that the com-
mon sense of laymen is preferable to the learning of the professional
judge in evaluating credibility, or in applying community-based standards
of conduct such as negligence or recklessness.
c) Laymen are a force for simplification in the administration of crimi-
nal justice. When procedure and substance must be made comprehensible
to ordinary citizens, the law is more likely to be formulated simply, which
in turn promotes fair warning and thereby contributes to the deterrent
purpose of the criminal law.
Whatever weight is attached to these policies, it seems unlikely that
there is much to choose from between jury and mixed court in achieving
them. In either format the professionals must make themselves under-
stood to the laymen, and the laymen will bring whatever folk wisdom
they possess.
4. The Jury Represents the Community
The Supreme Court's decision authorizing the jury of 6 in Williams v.
Florida asserted that the difference between 12 and 6 jurors was not func-
tionally significant, hence not of constitutional dimension. Some valuable
empirical scholarship done after Williams casts a good deal of doubt on
that proposition. Justice Blackmun's opinion relied heavily on this work
in Ballew v. Georgia, where the court refused to legitimate a jury smaller
than 6.60
The main theme of the scholarship that Blackmun's opinion in Ballew
follows is that the quality of jury decision making is positively correlated
with group size.61 Some of the proofs of this proposition were related to
peculiar features of jury structure. For example, it was shown that larger
juries have more opportunities to remember important evidence, a
feature that was thought to be of consequence because most juries do not
(and indeed are often not allowed to) take notes. 62 But empirical results
of a more telling nature were canvassed in the Ballew opinion:
a) "[T]he smaller the group, the less likely it is to overcome the biases
of its members to obtain an accurate result. When individual and group
decisionmaking were compared, it was seen that groups performed better
60. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
61. [d. at 231-33, esp. Richard O. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Em-
pirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 643 (1975).
62. 435 U.S. at 233 and sources cited id. at n.l3.
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because prejudices of individuals were frequently counterbalanced, and
objectivity resulted. Groups also exhibited increased motivation and self-
criticism. All these advantages, except, perhaps, self-motivation, tend to
diminish as the size of the group diminishes. Because juries frequently
face complex problems laden with value choices, the benefits are impor-
tant and should be retained. In particular, the counterbalancing of vari-
ous biases is critical to the accurate application of the common sense of
the community to the facts of any given case."63
b) Several studies raised doubts "about the accuracy of the results
achieved by smaller and smaller panels. "64 In one experiment the propor-
tion of inconsistent verdicts increased as jury size decreased; another study
showed greater variability of compromise results in smaller panels. 65
c) Smaller juries decrease the likelihood that jurors will adhere to a mi-
nority view. "The chance for hung juries would decline accordingly."66
This "foretells problems not only for jury decisionmaking, but also for
the representation of minority groups in the community. The Court re-
peatedly has held that meaningful community participation cannot be at-
tained with the exclusion of minorities or other identifiable groups from
jury service. "67
It would be very difficult to reconcile the German mixed courts of two
laymen with the values of numerosity that the Supreme Court elevated to
constitutional dimension in Ballew. The largest of the German panels
contains 5 judges, professional and lay; 5 was the jury size that Ballew
held insufficient. There are, of course, factors that work to lessen the sig-
nificance of the contrast between mixed courts containing 2 laymen and
jury courts with 6 or 12. The participation of professional judges in delib-
eration is a force for modulation of lay bias without counterpart in jury
trial. The requirement of written findings and opinion, coupled with the
liberality of appellate review, is the main German safeguard against inac-
curate adjudication. And the Ballew opinion overstates the representa-
tiveness of the jury, because it does not allow for the effects of the Amer-
ican voir dire and challenge practice in reducing the representativeness of
jury panels.
Mixed courts with larger numbers of laymen function elsewhere in Eu-
rope. 68 Indeed, until 1975 the Germans used a panel of six lay and three
professional judges for the gravest offenses (the Schwurgericht). That
court has since been reconstituted as a Two-Three court. This reduction
63. [d. at 233-34 (footnotes omitted).
64. [d. at 234.
65. [d. at 234-35.
66. [d. at 236.
67. [d. at 236-37.
68. See Casper & Zeisel, Laienrichter, supra note 1, at 9.
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from six laymen to two was legislated in 1974 without controversY,69 on
the view that the purposes of lay participation were as well served with
two as with six. The official commentary to the draft statute'° says, in an
unilluminating paragraph, that the need for the laymen to preponderate
has disappeared now that the state is more trustworthy and the indepen-
dence of the professional judiciary has been secured. The modern object,
says the commentary, is to facilitate the cooperation of lay and profes-
sional judges, for which goal the smaller panel is more fit; and the voting
rule does preserve the power of the two laymen on the Two-Three court
to resist conviction. Implicit in this statement is the view that larger
courts tend to produce more divergence of view,71 as Justice Blackmun
said in Ballew; but that this is not a virtue in a system that combines lay
and professional duties and that makes the product liable to searching
review.
5. The Jury May Decide Contrary to Law
The jury's celebrated law-nullifying power takes advantage of two fea-
tures of Anglo-American practice that are without counterpart in the
German mixed-court system: the general verdict that conceals the
grounds of decision, and the rule against prosecutorial appeal from ac-
quittal. The debate about the merits of the law-nullifying power can be
followed in the large literature72 that it has engendered. To the claim that
the jury serves as a mini-legislature protecting citizens against unjust
laws, the response is made that law nullifying is a sorry excuse for law
reform; it leaves bad laws on the books and begets inconsistent results in
like cases. To the view that nullification permits the jury to do equity in
harsh cases, the response is that jury sympathy does not always favor the
angels. 73
The German mixed-court system effectively excludes law nullifying
from the lay functions. The professional judges are duty-bound to dis-
close erroneous grounds of decision in the written judgment that they
69. The one critical voice of note: Richard M. Honig, Ehrenamtliche Richter im Schwurgericht,
28 Monatsschrift fOr Deutsches Recht 898 (1974).
70. Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Ersten Gesetzes zur Reform des Strafver-
fahrensrechts (Drucksache 7/551) 54 (Bonn: Verlag Dr. Hans Heger, 1974).
71. Casper and Zeisel obtained a small amount of data from the former nine-judge Schwurge-
richt, in which they did find greater divergence. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 175-80.
72. Compare Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions? 21 U. Chi. L. Rev.
386 (1954), with Alan W. Schellin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 168
(1972).
73. For further discussion of the jury policies see the effort at cataloging pros and cons that was
submitted by the University of Chicago Jury Project as "Memorandum Regarding Jury System," in
Recording of Jury Deliberations: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 58 Before the Subcommittee to In-
vestigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 63-81 (1955). See also Patrick
Devlin, Trial by Jury (rev. 3d impression; London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1966).
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prepare for the mixed court. Accordingly, laymen preparing to bend or
disregard the law confront professionals who say, "This will not stand up
on appeal." Reasoned judgment and appeal-those safeguards of the
German system that figure so recurrently when we examine the differ-
ences between the systems-are here decisive in precluding an arguable
safeguard.
B. Pluses and Minuses
The results of the inquiry we have been conducting may be summarized
in three propositions. (1) In a few important respects the mixed court
serves the jury policies better than the jury itself. (2) Over most of the
range of jury policies there is little to choose between the two systems. (3)
But there are key jury policies that are diminished in mixed-court proce-
dure.
The first and last of these points require amplification.
The mixed court extends lay participation to sentencing (which is the
sphere of criminal adjudication in which the legal training of the profes-
sional judge may be thought to be least relevant). Since German criminal
justice forbids any form of nontrial disposition for imprisonable of-
fenses, there is lay participation in every sentencing decision in cases of
truly serious crime. One of the most interesting discoveries of the Casper
and Zeisel study was that in the 41 percent of the case sample in which
the accused had confessed, the time spent by the mixed court on delibera-
tion (as distinct from trial) differed "hardly at all"74 from the cases in
which guilt was contested. This enabled the authors to infer that in both
types of cases "the bulk of deliberation time is devoted to the sentencing
issue. "75 It should also be recalled that Casper and Zeisel found initial
lay/professional disagreement concerning sentence in 20.1 percent of
their cases, and that the lay judges persisted in their view and affected the
outcome in 32 percent of these cases. In providing laymen this voice in
sentencing, the mixed court advances all of the jury purposes in an im-
mensely important area of criminal adjudication from which the common
law tradition excludes the jury.
The mixed court also serves the jury purposes at a higher level by in-
forming the laymen better. Because the device of integrating lay and pro-
fessio)lal judges spares the mixed court the need for evidentiary exclu-
sions or other attempts at jury control, the laymen hear the full case
rather than the fragments to which our system restricts jurors.
Beyond question, however, the limitations on lay autonomy that are
integral to the mixed-court system would disserve the purposes of the
jury system in two significant respects. In the matter of numerosity and
74. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 1, at 150.
75. [d.
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the values associated with it, there would be great difficulty in equating 2
laymen with 6 or 12, if that feature of current German court structure
were retained. Further, the mixed court quite deliberately suppresses the
law-nullifying impulse by having professional judges sit with the laymen
and be responsible for disclosing the grounds of decision in a reviewable
written judgment.
C. Emulating the Mixed Court
The initial premise of this article, to which we can now return, is that
Americans looking for solutions to the intractable problems of our crimi-
nal procedure might find the mixed court a worthy object of emulation.
Both on account of its own efficiencies, and because it would be likely to
promote some of the further efficiencies associated with nonadversarial
procedure, the mixed court could be thought to be an improvement over
the institutions of a criminal justice system that has lost most of its
capacity to adjudicate criminal cases.
In Duncan v. Louisiana Justice White took pains to point out that even
the constitutionalization of jury trial mandated for the states in that case
would not necessarily preclude a state from undertaking an institutional
and procedural reconstruction of its criminal justice system so fundamen-
tal that the end result could be juryless. "A criminal process which was
fair ana equitable but used no juries is easy to imagine. It would make
use of alternative guarantees and protections which would serve the pur-
poses that the jury serves in the English and American systems.",6 We
have seen why the mixed court may be claimed to have those qualities of
alternative safeguard that the opinion in Duncan envisages.
If we were to explore such a wholesale choice of systems, the propo-
nent of the mixed court would frame the question thus: Which is more
desirable, a system that slightly impairs some of the less important jury
values, but that is so efficient that it can permit-indeed require-full
trial with lay participation in every case of serious crime? Or a system
that nominally preserves all the purposes of the jury system but that is so
complex and costly that jury trial can only be used exceptionally?
However intriguing this formulation of the question, the issue it raises
is scarcely worth pursuing. In order totally to excise jury trial from an
Anglo-American criminal procedural system, it would be necessary to
overcome centuries of experience, now distilled into ideology and mythol-
ogy, and entrenched in federal and state constitutions.
The main point to be drawn from the comparison of jury court and
mixed court is the mixed court's superiority, not to the jury, but to the
other institutions that we now use to dispatch the vast preponderance of
76. 391 u.s. at 150 n.14.
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our criminal caseloads: bench trial and plea bargaining. The mixed court
is an exceptionally good second best; it does not fully serve the jury
policies, but bench trial and plea bargaining abandon all the jury policies.
Bench trial eliminates lay participation from adjudication; plea bargain-
ing eliminates not only lay participation but adjudication itself.
The Supreme Court cases from Duncan to Ballew which reaffirm the
jury policies in constitutional dimension are profoundly deceptive. For in
the same years that it decided these cases, the Court placed its im-
primatur77 on the system of plea bargaining that has effectively elimi-
nated the role assigned to the jury in the Bill of Rights. The Framers
thought that they had made jury trial the exclusive mode of dealing with
cases of serious crime. The Sixth Amendment says: "In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial . .. by an impar-
tial jury ...."78
The Sixth Amendment meant what it said when it was drafted in 1791.
Well into the nineteenth century, jury trial was the routine dispositive
procedure for cases of serious crime. Bench trial-that is, trial by a pro-
fessional judge sitting without lay participation of any sort-developed in
the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century and was
not made generally available until well into the twentieth century.79 Con-
temporary legal thought resisted bench trial for cases of serious crime,
precisely because it so impaired the purposes of the jury guarantee.80 To
this day there is no analogue to bench trial in English criminal procedure
for the most serious categories of crime. The trial of a defendant accused
of murder, rape, or robbery can only be by jury.81 Plea bargaining is also
an American invention of the nineteenth century;82 in the previous cen-
tury trial courts actively discouraged attempts to plead guilty, urging de-
fendants to accept jury trial instead. 83
Well into the eighteenth century jury trial was still a summary proceed-
ing, and that is largely how the Framers conceived of it. For example, at
77. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971);
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
78. U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added).
79. See John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 Law & Soc'y
Rev. 261, 269-70 (1979).
80. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a statute authorizing bench trial under the state con-
stitution but recorded its disapproval. The opinion says that it is "impolitic and unwise . . . to
place the life or liberty of any person accused of crime, even by his own consent, at the disposal of
anyone man or two men, so long as man is a fallible being." State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349, 367
(1878).
8!. Unless, of course, the defendant waives all trial by pleading guilty. See R. M. Jackson, The
i Machinery of Justice in England 183 (7th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
82. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 Colum. L. Rev. I (1979); Langbein,
supra note 79.
83. See the evidence in John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 263, 278-79 (1978).
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the Old Bailey in London (which was the main criminal trial court of the
Anglo-American world), when the court sat it tried between 12 and 20
cases of felony per day. 84 Indeed, it was not until 1794 that a trial "ever
lasted for more than one day, and [in that case] the Court seriously con-
sidered whether it had any power to adjourn ...."85 By contrast, we
may note that the trial of Patricia Hearst for bank robbery in 1976 lasted
40 days,86 and that the average felony jury trial in Los Angeles in 1968 re-
quired 7.2 days of trial time. 87
The astonishing rapidity of eighteenth-century jury trial can be traced
to a variety of features that have since changed: 88
1. Neither prosecution nor defense was represented by counsel in ordi-
nary criminal trials. The victim or other complaining witness, sometimes
aided by the lay constable and the lay justice of the peace, performed the
role we now assign to the public prosecutor, gathering evidence and
presenting it at trial.
2. There was no counsel-conducted voir dire of prospective jurors. In
practice the accused took the jury as he found it and virtually never em-
ployed his challenge rights. Indeed, at the Old Bailey only two 12-man
jury panels were used to discharge the entire caseload of as many as a
hundred felony trials in a few days. Each jury usually heard several unre-
lated cases before deliberating on any. For comparison we may point to
the voir dire in the 1970-71 trial of Bobby Seale in New Haven that lasted
four months and involved the vetting of 1,035 prospective jurors.89
3. The most efficient testimonial resource available to a criminal court
is almost always the criminal defendant. He has, after all, been close
enough to the events to get himself prosecuted. In modern Anglo-Ameri-
can procedure we have constructed the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in a way that often encourages the accused to rely entirely upon the
intermediation of counsel and say nothing in his own defense. But in the
period before the accused had counsel, there could be no practical
distinction between his roles as defender and as witness. The accused
spoke continually at the trial, replying to prosecution witnesses and giv-
ing his own version of the events.
84. Langbein, supra note 83, at 277.
85. F. D. MacKinnon, The Law and the Lawyers, in 2 A. S. Turberville, ed., Johnson's England
287, 307 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933) (referring to R. v. Hardy, 24 St. Tr. 199 (1794».
86. United States, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1976 Annual Report of the
Director, app. at p. 1-41 table C9 (Washington, D.C.: Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, 1976).
87. The figure for Los Angeles appears in San Francisco Committee on Crime, A Report on the
Criminal Courts of San Francisco, Part I: The Superior Court Backlog-Consequences and Rem-
edies 1 (1970). See Langbein, supra note 16, at 10 n.18, for further discussion of this and com-
parable figures.
88. The following account is based on Langbein, supra note 83.
89. New York Times, March 12, 1971, p. 43, summarized in Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, &
Jerold H. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 1329 (4th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.,
1974).
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4. The presentation of evidence and the cross-examination of witnesses
and accused took place in a fashion that was businesslike but lacked the
time-consuming stiffness of a modern adversary trial, which has strict
rules of sequence and phase preclusion. The trial judge superintended this
"altercation"9O of witnesses and accused, occasionally examining or
cross-examining, and he exercised a broad power to comment upon the
evidence.
5. The common law of evidence, which has injected such vast com-
plexity into modern criminal trials, was virtually nonexistent as late as the
middle decades of the eighteenth century. The trial judge had an alterna-
tive system of jury control that was both swifter and surer than the subse-
quent resort to rules of admissibility and exclusion. He had unrestricted
powers of comment on the merits of criminal cases; he could reject a ver-
dict that displeased him and require the jury to deliberate further; indeed,
until 1670 he had been able to fine a jury that persisted in acquitting
against his wishes.
6. In an age before professional police and prosecutors, the problems
of controlling such officers and protecting the accused from abuse of
their powers lay wholly in the future. The remarkable American exercise
of attempting to substitute exclusionary rules of evidence for a direct sys-
tem of discipline was not yet operating to protract the criminal process.
7. There was as yet virtually no appeal in criminal cases. Accordingly,
the familiar modern machinations of counsel directed to provoking and
preserving error for appeal were unknown.
The criminal justice that was administered in this system of summary
jury trial was rough indeed. We are not surprised, therefore, that pres-
sures developed over the subsequent two centuries to modify jury trial in
order to increase the level of protection against mistaken conviction.
What historical research has not yet explained is why these pressures led
in the Anglo-American procedure to the law of evidence and the lawyer-
ization of the trial, reforms that ultimately made jury trial so complicated
and time-consuming that it became unworkable as a routine dispositive
procedure. Similar pressures for safeguard were felt on the Continent in
the same period, but they led to reforms, including the development of
the mixed court, that preserved the institution of triaJ.91
If the developments that have rendered jury trial impractical had hap-
pened in a concentrated and visible fashion, Americans might have had
occasion to give proper consideration to devising alternatives capable of
preserving some of the jury policies. What actually occurred over the last
90. The famous term of Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum 80 (London 1583).
91. This paragraph is derived from John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, The Public
Interest, Winter 1980, at 49-50.
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century was a gradual and somewhat stealthy growth of bench trial and
plea bargaining. Only because this departure from our supposed constitu-
tional principles is now so familiar to us do we fail to appreciate how as-
tounding the phenomenon really is (and how bizarre it appears to
foreigners who encounter it afresh). A substitute criminal procedural sys-
tem, wholly devoid of lay participation, has displaced jury trial in prac-
tice, even while the Supreme Court has been celebrating the virtues of the
jury and purporting to extend the constitutional jury guarantee to the
states.
By narrowing the gap between our jury entitlement and our nonjury
system, the Continental mixed court would in principle be a manifestly
superior alternative to bench trial and especially to plea bargaining. If, as
I believe, the day must come when the level of dissatisfaction with the
plea bargaining system becomes intolerable, Americans may finally
undertake the search for a principled alternative to adversary jury trial.
The mixed-court system that I have described in operation in West Ger-
many provides full adjudication with lay participation in every case of
serious crime. Because the mixed-court system is so imbued with the
ideals that underlie our constitutional jury guarantee, it deserves to be the
subject of some experimentation and adaptation in the United States.
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